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TAX REFORM FOR TAX COMPETITION: 
WHICH ALTERNATIVES SHOULD BE USED?**
In this article the authors’ objective is to discover the extent to which the 
economic concept of interest-adjusted income taxation, which from a national 
standpoint is most attractive, can also render a country more attractive as a 
business location in global tax competition. In order to achieve this objective 
the authors fi rst attempt to determine the rules that must be complied with by 
a country in the structuring of its domestic tax law against the background 
of global tax competition. A central factor here is the prohibition of tax 
discrimination between domestic and foreign taxpayers, whereby domestic 
tax law is subservient to the requirements of international tax law. National 
sovereignty remains intact, however, with regard to the choice of a concept 
for the tax system to be adopted. With this in mind, the authors show that 
the attractiveness of a country as a business location with a given tax rate 
is enhanced by the introduction of an interest-adjusted income tax with the 
deduction of interest on equity capital as a special feature. This is refl ected in 
the principal international measure of the tax burden, the Effective Average 
Tax Rate (EATR).
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I. Introduction 
Is tax competition harmful or useful? Referring to the paper by Lars Feld in 
this journal, No. 9/20051, after a broad review of the main theoretical arguments 
and the empirical evidence, the answer is that it is useful rather than harmful. 
On the basis of this thesis, we fi rst try to draw a dividing line between fair 
and unfair tax competition arguing that rules have to be set in order to prevent tax 
discrimination between foreigners and residents (“ring-fencing”) (Part II). This, 
of course, restricts the scope of national tax policies, but does not affect the sover-
eign choice of the national tax base. Building the basis for the decision to choose 
a certain concept of taxation, we present some criteria for defi ning an optimal tax 
system (Part III). We demonstrate effects of the traditional concept of income taxa-
tion which governs the income taxation of most European countries (Part IV). We 
then evaluate alternative tax systems with respect to those criteria from a national 
point of view (Part V). Avoiding “ring fencing”, tax competition necessitates tak-
ing into account not only the international competitiveness of tax systems but also 
the effi ciency aspects in a domestic setting. We show that the tax reform option 
of an interest-adjusted income tax system will satisfy both the domestic criteria 
of an optimal tax system and the requirements which are set by international tax 
competition. In this context, we calculate the well known measures of Effective 
Marginal and Effective Average Tax Rates (EMTR and EATR) for an interest-ad-
justed tax system and compare them to the ones that can be determined for different 
EU-countries’ traditional tax systems (Part VI). The international attractiveness of 
an interest-adjusted tax system can be proved thereby.2 Finally, in Part VII, a brief 
conclusion encompasses the main results of our article. 
II. Fair and unfair (harmful) tax competition in the EU 
Communities of countries such as the EU can decide to harmonise their tax 
systems. Whether and how this has to proceed can only be judged on the basis of the 
common goals established by the community and the limitations to the sovereignty 
of individual states that have been accepted. One of the prime objectives of the EU 
1 Cf. Feld, L. (2005). 
2 Our paper, however, is not prepared to discuss all merits and practical issues of an interested-
adjusted system of taxing income from capital and current tax reform initiatives in Europe incorporating 
this element. There is an extensive body of literature and other sources available for readers interested 
in this broad analysis. See for example Boadway / Bruce (1984), Keen / King (2003), Rose (1999), 
Wenger (1999) and papers which may be downloaded from www.einfachsteuer.de.
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is the dismantling of barriers to competition  and not the limitation of competition, 
as this is a policy that will raise welfare standards in all member states. If competi-
tion for the best tax system contributes to an improvement of welfare in the EU, it 
should not be limited or even blocked by harmonisation regulations. If a member 
state applies a system to tax the capital income of its citizens and therewith enter-
prise profi ts too, such a system must be – provided that foreigners and residents 
are treated equally – accepted as internationally fair. The same argument holds for 
example for a tax system with an interest-adjusted tax base. 
A country choosing one of alternative tax systems which are described in Part 
V is not, therefore, in our view, pursuing a policy directed against the interests of 
the EU. Hence, there is no reason to forbid a country’s adoption, for example, of 
the dual income tax system introduced by the Nordic countries or of the model of 
tax exemption for normal market returns which are characterized as alternatives 
B2 and B3 in Part V. The economic performance of enterprises in the EU would 
rather be gravely impaired if the EU were to impose a harmonisation model based 
on the traditional system of income and profi t taxation (see Part III).  
According to the declared objectives of the community, a country’s tax policy 
is to be considered unfair, if it offers particularly attractive conditions for invest-
ments that are not based on the principles of a system of equal treatment of equal 
incomes (profi ts) – irrespective of the investor’s residence.3 With regard to unfair 
tax competition, a similar view is shared by the OECD.4 
Unequal tax treatment of foreign and domestic investors can occur directly 
and indirectly. In this context, the privileged taxation of corporations – as compared 
to enterprises with business profi ts taxed at the personal level of the shareholder 
– generates special tax benefi ts for foreign investors since those operate typically 
in the legal form of corporations. A country pursuing such a strategy avoids the 
revenue loss that would arise within a regime of fair tax competition, i.e. under an 
equal treatment of profi ts, irrespective of the enterprise’s legal form.5 The revenue 
loss could be further reduced by raising the tax rate on dividends – which affects 
only resident shareholders – in order to compensate for the lowered corporate tax 
rate.
Another example of unfair methods are special regulations that are not integral 
elements of the system and govern the taxation of returns from fi nancial assets, for 
example, by offering special tax relief to holding companies. If a country taxes the 
returns from real investments in one way and those from certain fi nancial invest-
ments in another, no justifi cation is possible in terms of a tax system.  
3 Cf. Commission of the European Union (1997).
4 Cf. OECD (1998).
5 Privileges in the taxation of business profi ts granted only to corporations may also implicitly 
discriminate against income from labour.
M. RIMMLER, M. ROSE, D. ZÖLLER: Tax Reform for Tax Competition: Which Alternatives should be Used?
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 56 (11) 1079-1100 (2005)1082
According to the proposed criterion of fair and unfair (harmful) tax competi-
tion, for example, Estonia, Ireland, Hungary, Austria and Croatia are all currently 
applying a form of enterprise taxation that runs counter to community interests, 
as not all forms of capital income – e.g. the profi ts of a sole proprietor and small 
partnerships not liable to profi t tax but to (personal) income tax – are subject to 
the same reduced tax rate. Some proposals which aim at a further reduction of the 
rate of the German corporation income tax without at the same time reducing the 
rates applied to all other kinds of capital income also fail to meet the criterion of 
international fair tax competition. 
The new Slovak tax law, on the other hand, is system-based and can be judged 
internationally fair. There is, therefore, no need whatsoever to harmonise the Slovak 
system with any new standard EU-model. As far as Slovakia can afford low tax 
rates because of grants given by the EU, this EU-policy could be criticized. How 
much Slovakia receives in the form of grants from the EU does not depend upon the 
nature of the Slovak tax system but on the EU system for allocating its funds. If the 
EU takes exception to the low tax rates applied in some individual member states, 
it should implement a sweeping reform of the system for allocating its funds.
One can well imagine, however, an EU-tax policy which aims at dissuading 
member states from using privileges granted by means of special regulations to 
certain types of income (e.g. corporation profi ts) which are not in line with their 
tax systems in order to attract internationally mobile capital from other member 
states. This is a very demanding task since in most EU countries tax laws are not 
framed in accordance with a system. On the other hand, not every deviation from 
a system has a problematic dimension from an international standpoint.  
Against this background, the EU’s efforts to lay down as quickly as possible 
uniform procedures for calculating the profi ts of corporations or even to stipulate 
minimum tax rates are incompatible with the principles of (fair) tax competition. 
Whether the profi ts of an enterprise are calculated, for example, according to the 
cash principle or rather according to the accrual principle depends upon the system. 
The same holds for the deduction of interest on equity capital within the system of 
interest-adjusted income taxation (see alternative B3 of Part V).
Competition among different tax systems has by no means resulted in gen-
eral acceptance of the best tax base for all EU countries. The OECD’s model for 
the calculation of profi ts is only one conceivable model among many and cannot 
therefore be accepted as a reference model for the determination of harmful tax 
competition. 
In this respect we must refute the thesis that the standardisation of tax bases 
is merely a formal harmonisation that can only be regarded as an instrument to en-
hance transparency. In fact, this would take away a country’s sovereignty to decide 
upon the system of income taxation. Those supporting the EU’s rapid EU-wide 
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harmonisation of tax bases, for instance on the basis of the OECD model, overlook 
the fact that the burden imposed by a tax system does not only depend upon the tax 
rates but without doubt also upon the tax bases that have been selected. This will 
be demonstrated at length in Part VI of this article. Competition among tax systems 
must permit competition for the best tax bases. As, in general, it can be chosen 
from several tax systems, the EU should rather concentrate its efforts on developing 
criteria for judging unfair deviations from a system that has been chosen freely as 
the result of the sovereign decisions of individual member states. 
III. Criteria for establishing an optimal tax system 
The following targets and criteria, which are important for the design of a 
country’s optimal tax system, will at the same time also determine its success in 
global tax competition. For any country attempting to choose an optimal tax system, 
the prime objective is to ensure that the tax law adopted secures the highest level 
of economic welfare possible for its citizens. 
The level of economic welfare of any country is fundamentally determined 
by the economic performance of its enterprises in whatever organisational form 
(sole-proprietorship including all kinds of self-employment, partnerships and 
corporations). It should and will be of the greatest interest to any country that the 
economic performance of enterprises develops as freely as possible and that the 
tax system does not constitute a hindrance thereto, i.e. it should guarantee decision 
neutrality as far as possible.6 Only then will the criterion of economic effi ciency 
be satisfi ed. Taxation should not interfere with the process of capital formation in 
particular, as otherwise an  excess burden will arise causing welfare losses due to 
tax-induced changes of investment decisions. 
Furthermore, from the domestic perspective, direct taxes must satisfy the 
criterion of fairness in that they do not impose upon certain types of income a 
higher or lower burden than is imposed on others. This requires that the profi ts of 
enterprises of different legal forms should bear equal tax burdens (neutrality with 
respect to legal form) and that capital income should not bear a higher tax burden 
than income from employment. In addition, there must be no special privileges 
for foreign companies (“ring fencing”), as this would amount to discrimination 
against domestic enterprises and run counter to fair international tax competition 
described in Part II.
6 Cf. Rose, M. (1999); Rose, M (2003). 
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In order to gain advantage from international trade and the mobility of both 
physical and human capital, it is in a country’s own interest to have tax laws which 
on the one hand do not raise obstacles to the free exchange of goods, services and 
capital or to the mobility of its employees and on the other hand also help establish 
an attractive environment for foreign investment and highly-skilled employees.
In order to meet the important criterion of transparency, tax laws should be 
framed exclusively according to a clear system. This would help reduce tax com-
pliance cost of citizens and enterprises. 
IV. The concept of traditional income taxation
In the competition to achieve the best tax system, those alternatives are most 
promising that will result in a better performance by enterprises operating within 
the domestic territory of the country concerned and in an increase in the working 
population’s stock of human capital. 
In the traditional system of taxing income7, the fairness principle is oriented 
according to the burden on yearly income and assumes that equal taxation means 
equal yearly burdens. It is well known, however, that the traditional system of 
income and profi t taxation imposes a heavy tax burden on enterprises, i.e. 
- the taxation of normal market returns on equity capital means that a double 
tax burden is imposed, as the equity capital formed in the enterprise from 
taxed profi ts will already have reduced the available profi ts from investment8 
and
- the taxation of the profi t arising from the disposal of shares of corporations 
creates a triple burden on normal market investment returns, and a double 
7 The traditional concept of income taxation has its origin in the famous article “Der Einkom-
mensbegriff und die Einkommensteuergesetze” by Georg von Schanz. Cf. von Schanz, G. (1896). 
In the American tax literature the birth of the traditional concept of income taxation is linked with 
the names of Henry C. Simons und Robert Murray Haig. Cf. Simons, H. C. (1938) and Haig, R. M. 
(1921[1959]). Cf. also Musgrave, R. A. (1990); Goode, R. (1977) and Rimmler, M. R. (2005).  
8 This theorem of tax incidence is well-known in the literature of taxing income from capital. 
Unfortunately the theorem is often described as ‘double taxation’. The correct description, however, 
here should be ‘double burdening’ because the pre-burdened return on savings is taxed only once. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1929/30, p. 125) described this phenomenon of intertemporal tax incidence 
most clearly as follows: „The benefi t the saver will get out of the saved income part is the return 
on his investment. This return is, however, diminished twice as a result of the ruling (tax) practise. 
Firstly, the income tax levied on savings will cause the return to be smaller than it would have been 
without taxation. Secondly, this return already diminished by income tax is burdened once more by 
income tax.”
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burden on pure economic profi ts, i.e. on those parts of profi ts that exceed 
normal market rates of interest on equity capital.   
The investment and tax burden example in Table 1 clearly illustrates this 
evaluation. 
It is assumed that a young man or woman aged 25 founds an enterprise with 
the legal form of a corporation in the year 2005. The profi ts are retained in the 
company and – as a result – its market value increases. The entrepreneur covers his 
living costs with the salary he receives as chief executive of the corporation. At the 
end of each year he calculates the extra income that he could realise through the 
sale of his enterprise after payment of income tax on capital gain and that would be 
available to cover his private consumption needs. To simplify matters, we assume 
that the capital gain which the entrepreneur and shareholder will receive in the 
case of disposing his shares in the company is equal to the equity capital invested 
in the company.
Tab. 1:
TAX BURDEN ARISING FROM TAXING ENTERPRISE PROFITS 









after profi t tax 











profi t and 
income tax in %
2005 10 000 7 500 25,0 5 625 43,8
2015 14 802 10 079 31,9 7 559 48,9
2025 21 911 13 546 38,2 10 160 53,6
2035 32 434 18 204 43,9 13 653 57,9
2045 48 010 24 465 49,0 18 349 61,8
In the given example of a hypothetical investment project - assuming neither 
profi t nor income tax - the pure profi t of the fi rst year amounts to 10 000 €. Starting 
in the second year, the enterprise earns a yearly normal gross rate of return of 4 % 
on equity capital which is fully invested. Thus, in the tax-free reference situation 
both the equity capital and the capital gain from disposing the company will grow 
at the rate of 4 % and amount to the fi gures as given in the second column of table 
1. Imposing a traditional system of profi t and income taxation with a uniform rate 
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of 25 % the fi rst year gross pure profi t of 10 000 € will be reduced to an amount of 
7 500 € which - because of its investment -  is now the initial equity capital stock. 
Starting in the second year, due to profi t tax the rate of return on investment will 
be reduced from 4 % to the net rate of 3 %. At the same time this means that both 
equity capital and capital gain will grow at this new rate resulting in the fi gures as 
given in the third column of table 1. Tax burden at the business level is calculated 
as the loss in equity capital due to profi t taxation, i. e. tax burden from profi t tax 
amounts to the difference between the fi gures in column 2 and the fi gures in col-
umn 3 of table 1. If these differences are related to the equity capital in the tax-free 
situation as given in column 2 we will arrive at the tax burden in relative terms as 
presented in column 4 of table 1. 
As the investment example shows, from the second year the tax burden exceeds 
the tax rate and this difference increases as the investment period lengthens. Should 
the entrepreneur wish to retire at the age of 65, he will discover upon examining the 
investment capital in his enterprise that, in comparison with the situation without 
any tax, he has lost almost 50 % of his equity capital through payment of the profi t 
tax at a statutory tax rate of only 25 %. If he now wishes to make this investment 
capital available for consumption purposes and decides to sell his enterprise, he 
must then also pay income tax on his gain on disposal, which has resulted from 
the increase in the value of his enterprise generated by the investment of taxed 
profi ts. As acquisition costs do not exist in the example given, the entire revenue 
from disposing the company is taxed as income. Hence, revenue from disposing the 
company and taxable capital gain are equal to the fi gures as given in column 3 of 
table 1. Applying a tax rate of 25 % on this base of income tax the net capital gain 
which the entrepreneur can use for consumption purposes amounts to the fi gures 
in column 5 of table 1. In comparison with the situation without any taxes this 
constitutes a further tax burden. All in all the entrepreneur’s fund for fi nancing his 
consumption in retirement has been reduced by 61.8 % (column 6 of table 1). 
Most current tax systems mainly follow the guidelines of the traditional system 
and are therefore an obstacle to the effi cient performance of business enterprises. 
However, tax theory has developed systems that are much less of a hindrance to 
the economic performance of enterprises. A specifi c feature of these systems is 
a new concept of fairness which is based on the notion of equal tax burdens for 
equal lifetime incomes. Hence, it takes into consideration the fact that, by virtue 
of the former taxation of the income used for its formation, today’s capital income 
already bears a tax burden without ever having been taxed. For a country trying 
to gain from tax competition there are options for it to be able to offer better tax 
environments for investments than those in other countries which are bound to the 
traditional concept of taxing personal income and business profi t. 
In the following part, different tax systems and policy options are introduced 
and their characteristics explained. The perspective will be that of a domestic in-
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vestor, since the tax system chosen under tax competition also directly determines 
the tax-burden for residents, unless the country concerned wishes to run the risk 
of promoting “ring fencing”. 
V.  Alternatives in the competition for the best tax system 
 
In both the literature and policy platforms several reform alternatives have 
been discussed the implementation of which would result – compared with a tra-
ditional tax system – in a „normalisation“ of the tax burden on investment returns 
and therefore competitive advantages for the country concerned. The following 
alternatives seem to be the most important ones:
A. Raising of consumption taxes, which have less impact on investment in 
enterprises. This means  cutting  back direct taxes in general and, for ex-
ample, raising the rate of the value- added tax guaranteeing tax revenue 
neutrality. The disadvantage of such a policy is a shifting of the distribution 
so that lower incomes now bear a higher burden. The net effect, however, 
is unclear. Higher investment leads to higher levels of employment, which 
also benefi ts the lower income brackets.    
B. Restructuring of direct taxes in order to reduce or eliminate multiple tax 
burdens.  
B1. Introducing a system of dividend taxation. Profi ts that are invested 
shall be tax-free and only profi ts distributed as dividends to sharehold-
ers and then used to fi nance personal consumption shall be subject 
to taxation. The same shall hold for all forms of return from citizens’ 
savings. 
B2. Introducing a system of Dual Income Taxation (DIT)9 with lower rates 
for all forms of capital income and, therefore, for enterprise profi ts. 
B3. Introducing an “Allowance for Corporate Equity” (ACE)10 system (a 
system of interest-adjusted income taxation). The ACE is characterized 
by a deduction of a normal market rate of interest on equity capital 
together with the deduction of loan interest from taxable profi t. Divi-
dends and capital gains arising from the sale of shares of enterprises 
9 Cf. Sørensen, P. B. (1994); Cnossen, S. (1999).  
10 Cf. Rose, M. (2003); Schmidt, F. (1998); McLure, C. E. / Zodrow, G. R. (1990). The ACE con-
cept was developed at almost the same time by Ekkehard Wenger in Germany (cf. Wenger, E. (1983)) 
and Robin W. Boadway and Neil Bruce in America (cf. Boadway, R. W. / Bruce, N. (1984)). 
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are not taxed. This form of profi t taxation guarantees the taxation of 
a citizen’s lifetime income.11 Within this concept of income taxation 
the tax-burdening of income sources in past calendar years and also 
the taxation of income in future calendar years is accounted for. The 
annual fl ow of incomes must therefore be checked in order to determine 
whether they already have a tax burden history, i.e. whether any of 
these funds have already resulted in a tax burden for the taxpayer. If 
this is the case, they must be excluded from taxation in order to avoid 
a multiple tax burden on the same income. Income received shall be 
tax-free, if it is used to generate future income and if the taxation of 
such income in the future is assured. In this sense, all expenses in-
curred in the acquisition of interest-bearing capital claims or shares in 
enterprises can be regarded as deductible, since they represent amounts 
that have been saved by the citizen from his infl ow of income.
For Alternative A, quite apart from those limits established by the regulations 
governing membership in the EU, there is a limit by virtue of the fact that indirect 
taxes weigh upon the subsistence level of consumption, which impacts the lower 
income brackets in particular. As an impersonal tax, it is practically impossible 
to take into account the tax exemption of the subsistence level while performing 
market transactions. A differentiation of tax rates on necessities (low tax rates) 
and luxury goods (high tax rates) to effectively capture the tax-exemption of the 
subsistence level of consumption would only be a rough approximation generating 
further distortions. 
Alternative B1 as an integral system is currently not a feasible proposition 
for a single country operating in a globalized world economy, as insoluble prob-
lems would arise with regard to the avoidance of double taxation in the case of the 
generation of cross-border incomes.  
Alternative B2 guarantees only a partial “normalisation” of the tax burden 
on business profi ts and other kinds of capital income. It is not possible to choose 
the rate of tax on capital income in order to assure for all lengths of investment 
periods that the burden on capital income is fully adjusted to the burden on wages 
spent on immediate consumption. Furthermore, empirical evidence gathered in the 
Nordic countries which implemented a DIT in the 1990s has revealed the practical, 
administrative problems of clearly separating capital income taxed at lower rates 
from wages taxed at higher rates.12 
11 On the concept of lifetime income see Kay, J. A. / King, M. A. (1986); Mitschke, J. (1985) 
and Rimmler, M. R. (2005).  
12 Practical problems would, in contrast, not prevail if capital income is fi ctitiously determined 
by multiplying the equity base by a certain interest rate and taxed at a fl at rate. Deducting this capital 
income from the profi t tax base, the residual will be taxed  as wage income on the basis of a progres-
sive tax rate structure.  
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In contrast Alternative B3 as an integral system is a perfectly feasible pro-
posal for a single country operating in a globalized world economy.13 As can bee 
seen in table 2, which builds on the example of the investment project underlying 
table 1, the tax burden in relative terms exactly corresponds to the tax rate, so that 
in a lifetime perspective a single burden on all types of income is guaranteed. No 
problems would arise with regard to the avoidance of double taxation in the case 
of the generation of cross-border incomes.  
Tab. 2: 
TAX BURDEN ARISING FROM TAXING ENTERPRISE PROFITS 









after profi t tax 











profi t and income 
tax in %
2005 10 000 7 500 25,0 7 500 25,0
2015 14 802 11 102 25,0 11 102 25,0
2025 21 911 16 433 25,0 16 433 25,0
2035 32 434 24 325 25,0 24 325 25,0
2045 48 010 36 008 25,0 36 008 25,0
VI. Traditional vs. interest-adjusted income taxation 
 and tax competition in the EU 
In this section we shall attempt to determine the extent to which the practicable 
systems of interest-adjusted and traditional income taxation presented in Part V 
constitute attractive alternatives in international tax competition.14 For this purpose 
13 The ACE system was applied in Croatia between 1994 and 2001. Cf. Keen, M. / King, J. 
(2003).  
14 We do not take into consideration the value-added tax, the tax on distributed profi ts or the 
dual income tax. With regard to the structure of its tax base the latter corresponds to the traditional 
income tax; the different tax scales for incomes derived from work and capital have no signifi cance 
within the framework of the model applied here.  
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we shall consider the standpoint of a multinational enterprise with the legal form of a 
corporation with world-wide share ownership. Both the tax status and the residence 
of individual shareholders are unknown, so that our analysis is limited to taxation 
at corporate level and taxes on the personal level of the individual shareholder are 
therefore not accounted for.
Our analytical tool is the well-known measure of Devereux und Griffi th 
(1999), the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR), which is designed to assess dif-
ferent competing tax systems given a profi table investment. The investments and 
fi nancing of the enterprise under consideration are determined exogenously, so 
that pre-tax rates of return and distributed profi ts are fi xed.  We shall now examine 
the change in the payments fl owing to shareholders in  t=1 following a profi table 
(additional) investment in t=0 with due consideration given to the prevailing 
taxation conditions. Together with the statutory tax rate, the structure of the tax 
base is of decisive importance here. Special attention is given to the cash value 
of tax depreciation as well as – in the case of interest-adjusted income taxation 
– the deductible imputed interest on the equity capital that the investment under 
consideration brings with it. 
It is assumed that the investment under consideration can only be made in one 
country and that it would be too expensive to operate at two or more locations due, 
for example, to the fi xed costs that would be incurred.15 To this degree the choice 
of a business location is a discrete decision. A comparison of post-tax rates of re-
turn (with given pre-tax rates of return) under the different tax systems is a direct 
indicator of the competitiveness of a tax system in global tax competition. 
The international measure of the tax burden, the EATR, sets the difference 
between the net present value generated by the investment project in the fi ctitious 
tax-free world R* and the corresponding post-tax net present value R in relation to 
the discounted pre-tax rate of return p. The EATR enables us to compare the profi t-
ability of one and the same investment under different tax systems (or in different 
countries). In general it is as follows: 
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The EATR can provide no information on the optimal size of an investment 
to be made under a given tax system or on the minimum pre-tax rate of return 
at which the proposed investment would become profi table in comparison with 
alternative investments on the capital market. This pre-tax real rate of return on 
an investment project p~  is the lowest value of a pre-tax rate of return at which a 
business investment will be as attractive as an alternative investment on the capital 
market, hence at which it makes sense for the EATR to be calculated. In the case 
of taxes on the personal level not being taken into consideration, the value of the 
EATR belonging to p~ , which can be interpreted as the Effective Average Tax Rate 
of the marginal investment, just coincides with the Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
(EMTR).16 For the latter17: 
 s represents the post-tax real rate of return to the saver, which, if the tax on 
personal capital income is not taken into consideration at shareholder level, just 
corresponds to the real rate of interest r. 
In this case the EATR is the weighted arithmetic mean of the statutory tax 
rate and EMTR with marginal rates of return and rates above market rates, each 
normalized to the pre-tax rates of return, as the weighting factor. The lower the 
pre-tax rates of return, the greater is the weight given to the tax base (over the 
EMTR). The higher the pre-tax rates of return, the greater is the weight given to 
the statutory tax rate in the determination of the EATR.   
Figure 1 compares the EATRs – depending on the pre-tax rates of return – of 
ideal traditional, conventional traditional and interest-adjusted systems of income 
taxation. In order to focus attention on the infl uence of the different tax bases, we 
assume the same statutory tax rates of 25 %. The exogenous weighting of the fi -
nancing of the investment under consideration is in accordance with the following 
OECD weighting scheme: 55 % retained profi ts, 10 % new shares issued and 35 % 
debt.18 The curves representing the ideal traditional (TRA id) and the conventional 
traditional (TRA) system of income taxation are based on this weighting scheme. 
In addition the curve representing the equity-fi nanced ideal traditional system of 
income taxation (TRA id/eq) is presented, in order to show the reducing effect of 
debt fi nancing on the EATR. Due to the fi nancing neutrality of the interest-adjusted 
income and profi t taxes the weighting scheme is of no signifi cance for them. 
16 Cf. Devereux , M. P. / Griffi th, R. (1999), S. 21.
17 This measure is based on the works of Mervin A. King und Don Fullerton. Cf. King, M. A. 
/ Fullerton, D. (1984). 
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With regard to the rules governing depreciation in the conventional traditional 
system of income taxation, tax depreciation (15 %) was assumed to be signifi cantly 
higher than economic depreciation (10 %). The system of interest-adjusted income 
taxation satisfi es the criterion of depreciation neutrality, for which reason the di-
vergence between tax and economic depreciation is here without signifi cance.19 
The ideal traditional system of income taxation is characterised by the fact that tax 
depreciation and economic depreciation tally.20
The curves in Figure 1 show that for each given pre-tax rate of return the ef-
fective tax burden under the interest-adjusted profi t and income tax is signifi cantly 
less than in the three versions of traditional income taxation. The greatest differ-
ence against the ideal traditional system is registered in the case of 100 % equity 
fi nancing. In the case of partial fi nancing with debt capital (35 %) the EATR is 
lowered slightly as the interest on borrowings is deductible as a business expense. 
The tax depreciation of the conventional traditional system of income taxation, 
which is more rapid than economic depreciation, results in a  further reduction of 
the EATR. Moreover, in the interest-adjusted system of income taxation investment 
projects are implemented that would be unprofi table in the traditional system and 
are therefore not undertaken, although they would be rewarding before taxation 
(those with a pre-tax rate of return between 5 % (ACE) and 6.7 % (TRA id/eq), 
6.1 % (TRA id) or 5.7 % (TRA)). As the pre-tax rates of return rise, the effective 
tax rates under all four of the systems under consideration approach the statutory 
tax rate of 25 %. The fact that in the case of lower pre-tax rates of return the effec-
tive tax burden in an interest-adjusted system of income taxation lies substantially 
below the statutory rate can be attributed to the system itself: the tax is levied only 
on those rates that are higher than those prevailing on the market. Matters are quite 
different in the case of the conventional traditional system of income taxation. The 
slightly reduced effective burden of lower pre-tax rates of return in relation to the 
statutory rate can be attributed to more rapid tax depreciation compared to true 
economic depreciation as well as to the comparative advantage of fi nancing with 
debt capital. The traditional tax system achieves a lower EATR for lower pre-tax 
rates of return at the cost of effi ciency losses.  
In conclusion we note that, from the standpoint of international tax competitive-
ness, the interest-adjusted taxation of profi ts is extremely attractive in comparison 
with the traditional system of taxing profi ts, particularly in the case of investment 
projects that are not very profi table. However, with the same tax rate this advantage 
melts away when the pre-tax rates of return of investment projects increase.  
19 The neutrality features of an interest-adjusted income tax are analysed by Wenger, E. 
(1983), Boadway, R. W. / Bruce, N. (1984) and Schwinger, R (1992).
20 The ideal traditional system of income taxation serves as a reference system for a traditional 
income tax, as in accordance with the taxation of the net accrual to wealth it takes into consideration 
the true economic depreciation. In practice only a rough estimate of the true economic depreciation 
is possible. Tax depreciation frequently precede true economic depreciation.  
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Fig. 1: 
EATR: TRADITIONAL VERSUS INTEREST-ADJUSTED TAX BASE
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The attractiveness of interest adjustment is clearly demonstrated by Figure 
2, which compares the system of interest-adjusted income taxation with the pri-
marily traditional systems that prevailed in the different EU-15 countries in 2001. 
The three model versions of traditional income taxation discussed above are also 
represented. For the empirical calculation of the EATR and the EMTR a pre-tax 
rate of return of 20 %, a real market interest rate of 5 % and a 2 % rate of infl ation 
were assumed. Figure 2 does not take into consideration taxation at shareholder 
level of the multinational enterprise concerned. 
Figure 2 shows clearly that  the statutory tax rate exceeds the effective average 
tax rate in all countries except Ireland, which may point to more rapid tax deprecia-
tion in comparison with economic depreciation and, together with the deduction as 
business expenses of interest on debt capital, results in an EATR that is lower than 
the statutory rate. In Ireland on the other hand the rules governing tax depreciation 
induce a rise in the EATR compared to the statutory rate in spite of the deduction 
of debt capital. Due to the additional deduction of interest on equity capital the 
interest-adjusted system of income taxation has a lower EATR. 
In all EU-15 countries, with the sole exception of Italy, the profi t tax provides 
an incentive to reduce the level of investment. This is equivalent to stating that 
the effective marginal tax rate is positive. Projects that would be profi table before 
taxation are not implemented. The opposite holds true for Italy, whose tax system 
on the whole generates an excess of investment; here the EMTR is negative. Only 
depreciation-neutral interest adjustment guarantees an effective marginal tax rate 
of zero. Taxation does not result in a tax-induced change in the volume of invest-
ment.    
This is also demonstrated by Figure 3, which shows the capital costs of taxa-
tion. The capital costs, i.e. the pre-tax rates of return that render the investment 
project just profi table under the given tax system from the standpoint of the mul-
tinational enterprise and below which it would not be implemented, tally exactly 
in the interest-adjusted system with their capital costs in the tax-free situation. In 
all other EU countries (except Italy) the costs of capital are higher with the result 
that for reasons of taxation investment is not undertaken.
It should be noted that interest-adjusted income and profi t taxation renders a 
country extremely attractive as a location for investment in comparison with the 
EU-15 countries from the standpoint of a multinational enterprise. This is confi rmed 
by a comparison of the EATRs, in which only Ireland performs better thanks to its 
extremely low statutory tax rate. Moreover, investments are undertaken that in all 
other countries (except Italy) would not be implemented. Even Ireland’s perform-
ance is worse here due to the unattractive rules governing tax depreciation. Italy, 
on the other hand, cannot compete for suffi ciently profi table projects because of 
its high statutory tax rate of 40.25 %. 
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VII. Conclusion
Working on the assumption that tax competition between individual coun-
tries promotes the welfare of all, an attempt was made to draw a line between 
fair and unfair tax competition. It was argued that the choice of a tax system is 
a sovereign decision to be made by the country concerned and that this does not 
touch the level of fair or unfair tax competition. Only non-discrimination between 
domestic and foreign taxpayers must be secured in the sense of fair competition. 
If a country enjoys the freedom to choose its own tax system, it is then faced with 
the fundamental question of whether to opt for a traditional or an interest-adjusted 
system of taxation. The authors adopted a position with regard to the theoretical 
basis for such a decision. It was shown that not only does the interest-adjusted 
system of taxation satisfy all the desiderata – from a domestic standpoint – of an 
optimal tax system, but it is also highly attractive – as measured by the EATR – in 
an international perspective. This is a result of the tax-base effect that arises from 
the deductibility of interest at the normal market rate on equity capital in the tax 
balance sheet. This even enables a country to compete with others which, on the 
basis of a traditional concept of income taxation, have a signifi cantly lower statutory 
tax rate. This is confi rmed by a comparison with low-tax Ireland. Should a country 
wish to improve its attractiveness as a business location in global tax competition, 
rather than decide to lower its statutory tax rate, which would endanger both syn-
thetic taxation and neutrality of legal form, it should instead consider switching 
to the use of interest-adjusted enterprise profi t taxation. Belgium leads the fi eld in 
the European Union – with effect from 2007 enterprise profi ts will be taxed on an 
interest-adjusted tax base.23 
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POREZNA REFORMA ZA POREZNU KONKURENCIJU: 
KOJE ALTERNATIVE VALJA UPOTRIJEBITI?
Sažetak
Autori u ovome radu pokušavaju odrediti u kojoj mjeri ekonomski koncept oporezi-
vanja dohotka umanjenog za kamate (koji je sa nacionalnog stanovišta najatraktivniji) može 
učiniti zemlju privlačnijom poslovnom lokacijom u uvjetima globalne porezne konkurencije. 
Da bi postigli taj cilj, autori najprije pokušavaju odrediti pravila kojih se mora pridržavati 
neka zemlja kod oblikovanja domaćeg poreznog zakonodavstva, uzimajući u obzir globalnu 
poreznu konkurenciju. Ovdje se najviše mora voditi računa o zabrani porezne diskriminacije 
između domaćih i stranih poreznih obveznika, pri čemu je domaći porezni zakon podređen 
međunarodnome. Zemlja međutim zadržava suverenitet, jer sama odlučuje o izboru kon-
cepta poreznog sustava. Imajući to na umu, autori pokazuju da se privlačnost neke zemlje 
kao poslovne lokacije povećava ako se uvede oporezivanje dohotka umanjenog za kamate, 
s odbitkom kamata na dionički kapital kao posebnim obilježjem. Odraz toga je osnovna 
međunarodna mjera poreznog opterećenja (the Effective Average Tax Rate – EATR).
Ključne riječi: oporezivanje dohotka umanjenog za kamate, porezna konkurencija, 
efektivna porezna stopa
